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Fiona R. Burns* Reforming Testamentary Undue Influence
in Canadian and English Law
The traditional doctrine of testamentary undue influence developed in nineteenth
century England. Its utility, however, is limited since the doctrine requires the
person alleging undue influence to provide direct proof of coercion according
to a high standard. In England the doctrine has remained static and there
have been calls for reform. In Canada, some courts have ceased to apply the
traditional doctrine so that today there is no one consistent and coherent doctrine
of testamentary undue influence. This article explores two possible reforms of the
doctrine both of which are evident in recent Canadian case law: a presumption
of testamentary undue influence and a modified doctrine of testamentary undue
influence. It is argued that testators in both England and Canada would be best
protected by a three-tiered approach comprising a modified doctrine of undue
influence. It entails a presumption of validity where certain measures are taken in
the execution of a will; the modification of key elements of the traditional doctrine
relating to the testator's state of mind, reliance on circumstantial evidence and the
standard of proof- and the adoption of the modified doctrine in those cases where
a party challenges the inter vivos and testamentary gifts of a deceased donor on
the basis of undue influence.
La doctrine traditionnelle d'influence indue sur le testateur est n6e et a 6t5
6labor6e dans I'Angleterre du dix-neuvi~me si~cle. Elle est toutefois d'une
utilit6 limit6e puisqu'elle exige que la personne qui allegue qu'il y a eu influence
indue apporte une preuve directe et conforme J une norme stricte qu'il y a eu
coercition. En Angleterre, la doctrine est restue statique, et il y a eu des appels
, la r6forme. Au Canada, certains tribunaux ont cess6 d'appliquer la doctrine
traditionnelle avec le r6sultat qu'il n'y a aujourd'hui aucune doctrine uniforme et
coh~rente d'influence indue sur le testateur. Cet article examine deux r6formes
possibles de la doctrine, les deux ressortant clairement dans la jurisprudence
canadienne r6cente : une pr6somption dinfluence indue sur le testateur et une
doctrine modifi6e d'influence indue sur le testateur. L'auteur avance que les
testateurs, tant en Angleterre quau Canada, seraient mieux prot6gds par une
stratsgie . trois volets comportant une doctrine modifi6e dinfluence indue sur le
testateur. Cela suppose une pr6somption de validit6 lorsque certaines mesures
sont prises pour la signature du testament; la modification d'61ments cles de la
doctrine traditionnelle en ce qui a trait . I'6tat d'esprit du testateur, 1 la fiabilit
des 616ments de preuve circonstancielle et J la norme de preuve; et I'adoption
de la doctrine modifi6e dans les cas ot) une partie conteste les dons entre vifs
et les dons testamentaires d'un donateur d6c6d6 en invoquant Iexercice dune
influence indue.
* BA (Hons), LLB (Hons), LLM (Syd), LLM (Cantab), PhD (ANU), Senior Lecturer, Faculty of
Law, University of Sydney. I thank William Edwards and Myra Chen for their valuable research
assistance.
456 The Dalhousie Law Journal
Introduction
I. An overview of the traditional doctrine
II. The traditional doctrine
1. In modern English case law
2. In modern Canadian case law
a. Wrongdoing coupled with a relationship of control
b. The suspicious circumstances rule and undue influence
3. The "unintended gap" as a result of the traditional doctrine
III. Pathways of reform
1. The imposition of a rebuttable presumption of undue influence
in testamentary cases
a. A rebuttable presumption shifting the onus of proof
b. Triggers of a rebuttable presumption
c. Rebutting the presumption
2. Modification of significant elements in the testamentary
doctrine
a. The testator ' independence and freedom
b. Circumstantial evidence
c. Balance ofprobabilities
3. The preferable approach
IV. The reform of testamentary undue influence
1. Additional presumption of validity
2. The modified doctrine of testamentary undue influence applied
in all testamentary cases
3. The application of the modified doctrine of testamentary undue




The common law doctrine of testamentary undue influence has recently
stimulated some important academic comment from writers analyzing its
operation in England.' They have attacked the doctrine's lack of utility
in two ways. First, they argue that the criteria that must be met for its
application are so difficult to fulfill that throughout the Commonwealth2
I. Roger Kerridge, "Wills Made in Suspicious Circumstances: The Problem of the Vulnerable
Testator" (2000) 59 Cambridge L.J. 310 [Kerridge, "Suspicious Circumstances"]; P. Ridge, "Equitable
Undue Influence and Wills" (2004) 120 L.Q.R. 617.
2. Ridge, supra note I at 638.
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the doctrine is virtually redundant.3 Second, they contend that the practical
result of the onerous criteria has been that testators4 susceptible to influence
have been left unprotected from conduct that does not fall within the
coverage of the doctrine.' These conclusions, however, have been based
only on an analysis of a few countries like England,6 and have not taken
into account developments in Canada. Accordingly, the purpose of this
article is to compare and contrast the doctrine in England and Canada and
to investigate possible pathways for reform.
I. An overview of the traditional doctrine
Historically, English Ecclesiastical Courts refused probate of wills that had
been made under constraint, duress or coercion.7 In the nineteenth century,
probate courts labelled such conduct as undue influence, although it was
not necessarily the kind of behaviour that constituted undue influence
in the Court of Chancery.8 By the middle of the nineteenth century,
the decision of the House of Lords in Boyse v. Rossborough ('Boyse') 9
provided an enduring precedent for testamentary undue influence in
the modem era. In that case, Lord Cranworth indicated that evidence of
coercive conduct constitutes undue influence in a testamentary context.' 0
Therefore, in subsequent seminal authorities coercion by the beneficiary
or by someone on behalf of the beneficiary was the sole or predominant
indicator of undue influence." Significantly, evidence of coercive conduct
rather than the state of the testator's mind characteristically justified a
court finding that a beneficiary exercised undue influence.
Lord Cranworth also held that mere persuasion or the opportunity to
influence is insufficient. 2 Rather, undue influence has to be proved by
direct evidence of a high standard. It is not sufficient that the circumstances
3. Kerridge, "Suspicious Circumstances," supra note I at 325-326.
4. For the purpose of clarity and brevity of expression, a reference to a testator includes a reference
to a testatrix unless the context indicates otherwise.
5. Kerridge, "Suspicious Circumstances," supra note I at 325-328; Ridge, supra note 1 at 621-
626.
6. Ridge principally considers English and Australian cases: see supra note 1 at 621-626.
7. E.g. Hacker v. Newborn (1654) Style. 427; 82 E.R. 834 (Upper Bench, Westminster); Lamkin v.
Babb(1752) 1 Lee 1; 161 E.R. I (Ecc.Ct.).
8. Williams v. Goude (1828), 1 Hagg. Ecc. 577; 162 E.R. 682 (Ecc.Ct). W.H.D. Winder, "Undue
Influence and Coercion" (1939) 3 Mod. L. Rev. 97 at 104.
9. (1857), 6 H.L.C. 3, 10 E.R. 1192 (H.L.) [Boyse]. Note also Winder, supra note 8 at 105.
10. Ibid. at 48-49, 1211.
11. Parfiti v. Lawless (1872), L.R. 2 P. & D. 462 at 470, Lord Penzance [Parfitt]; Baudains v.
Richardson, [1906] A.C. 169 at 185 (P.C.) [Baudains]; Craigv. Lamourezu(1919), [1920] A.C. 349 at
357, 50 D.L.R. 10 at 15 (P.C.) [Craig]; Roger Kerridge, Parry & Clark: The Law of Succession, I I"
ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2002) at paras. 5-13 [Kerridge, Parry & Clark).
12. Supra note 9 at 48, 1211. Note Earl of Sefton v. Hopwood (1857), 1 F.& F. 578 at 580, 175 E.R.
860 at 86, Creswell J. (Northern Circuit, Liverpool Spring Assizes).
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are "consistent with the hypothesis of its having been obtained by undue
influence." 13 It has to be shown that the circumstances are "inconsistent
with the contrary hypothesis."'' 4 Therefore, the person challenging the will
has to demonstrate 5 that undue influence was exercised, that as a result the
will was made and that undue influence is the only possible explanation
for the existence of the will. 6 In subsequent cases, courts held that a party
challenging the will not only bears the onus of proof, but also bears the
costs of the action if that party fails to prove undue influence.' 7
Significantly, the doctrine of testamentary undue influence is in marked
contrast to equitable undue influence. Under the equitable doctrine, a
rebuttable presumption of undue influence arises in certain inter vivos
transactions. It was held in the nineteenth century that the presumption
does not operate in testamentary cases.'
8
It is strongly arguable that Lord Cranworth did not intend that the
doctrine either be defined so narrowly or so rigidly applied. First, while
Lord Cranworth described undue influence in terms of coercion, he also
provided another description that emphasizes the testator's state of mind as
well as the conduct of the beneficiary. He observed that undue influence
... must be an influence which can justly be described, by a person
looking at the matter judicially, to have caused the execution of a paper
pretending to express a testator's state of mind, but which really did not
express his mind, but expressed something else, something which he did
not really mean.19
This definition covers coercive conduct at its most extreme, but also
encompasses conduct that deprives the testator of the right of independent
agency and expression. Second, Lord Cranworth indicated that it is not
necessary to show that actual violence has been used or threatened. Undue
influence is a relative phenomenon and courts should take into account
disparities of strength and weakness, and knowledge and ignorance,
between the parties when determining if there has been undue influence.2"
13. Ibid. at 51, 1212. See R. Hull Q.C. & I.M. Hull, Macdonell, Sheard and Hull on Probate Practice,
41 ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1996) at 46.
14. Ibid.
15. Boyse, supra note 9 at49, 1211; Parfitt, supra note 11 at 474-475, Lord Penzance.
16. WVingrovev. Wingrove(1885),L.R. 11 P.D. 81 at 83, SirJames Hannen; Baudains, supra note 11
at 185 [Wingrove]; Craig, supra note 11 at 357, 15.
17. E.g. Re Cutcliffe (deceased); Le Duc v. Veness, [1959] P6, [1958] 3 All E.R. 642 (C.A.).
18. Parfitt, supra note 11 at 469, Lord Penzance; see also Craig, supra note 11 at 356-357, 14-15 and
P.V. Baker, "Notes" (1970) 86 L.Q.R. 447.
19. Boyse, supra note 9 at 34, 1205. Note Earl of Sefton v. Hopgood, supra note 12 at 581, 861,
Creswell J. (Northern Circuit, Liverpool Spring Assizes).
20. Ibid. at 48-49, 1211. See also Hall v. Hall (1868), L.R. I P. & D. 481 [Hall]; Wingrove, supra
note 16; Hull & Hull, supra note 13 at 45-46.
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Third, while Lord Cranworth held that undue influence normally arises
from the circumstances surrounding the making of the will,2 he observed
that "this principle must not be taken too far."22 He described a situation in
which an inference of undue influence could be made due to the existence
of what could be described as a relationship of control.2 1 When the testator
is not a free agent and is completely under the control of the beneficiary,
a court can find undue influence, even in the absence of direct evidence
concerning the making of the will. A relationship of control based on
overwhelming circumstantial evidence has been pleaded in a few cases,24
but it appears to have been generally overlooked by modem courts and
litigants alike.2
II. The traditional doctrine
1. In modern English case law
Since the decision in Boyse, the case law in England has generally reflected
a static and strict articulation and application of the doctrine of testamentary
undue influence. The major characteristic of testamentary undue influence
has remained coercive conduct that must be proved,26 cannot be presumed
from the facts of the case,27 and must be specifically raised in the
pleadings.28 The party challenging the will must prove testamentary undue
influence at a high standard which is demonstrated by direct evidence that
the testator was coerced into making the will or facts consistent only with
a hypothesis of undue influence.29 Accordingly, there are only a few cases
where undue influence has been pleaded alone.3" Instead, undue influence
21. Ibid. at 51, 1212.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid. Note Lovett v. Lovett (1857), 1 F. & F. 578 at 583; 175 E.R. 861 at 862, Erie J. (Norfolk
Circuit, Ayelsbury Spring Assizes); Hull & Hull, supra note 13 at 46. C.V. Margrave-Jones in
Mellows: The Law of Succession, 5 1 ed. (London: Butterworths, 1993) suggests at para. 5.47 that
such circumstances "will give rise to a presumption" of undue influence.
24. See, e.g., Parfitt, supra note 11 at 470, Lord Penzance; Baudains, supra note 11 at 83.
25. However, note Re Harden's Estate; Clayton and Hunt v. Brown [1959] C.L.Y.B. 3448, (1959)
The Times, 20 June (Stevenson J.) and Re Killick (Deceased); Killick v Poutney (30 April 1999) The
Times (Ch.D). In respect to Re Harden, see Margrave-Jones, supra note 23, at para. 5.48; C. Sawyer,
Principles of Succession, Wills & Probate, 2 1d ed. (London: Cavendish Publishing Ltd, 1998) at para.
4.8.5. One possible explanation is that the headnote of the case completely omitted reference to this
situation: see Boyse, supra note 9 at 3, 1193.
26. J.B. Clark & J.G. Ross Martyn, Theoboldon Wills, 151 ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1993)
at 41-42; Margrave-Jones, supra note 23, at paras. 5.45-5.50; Kerridge, Parry & Clark, supra note 11
at para. 5-13.
27. Clark & Ross Martyn, supra note 26 at 42; Margrave-Jones, supra note 23 at para. 5.49.
28. Low v. Gurthrie [1909] A.C. 278 (H.L.); Re Stott (deceased); Klouda v. Lloyds Bank Ltd(1979),
[1980] I All E.R. 259 (Ch.D.).
29. Clark & Ross Martyn, supra note 26 at 42; Margrave-Jones, supra, note 23 at para. 5.50.
30. E.g. Hall, supra note 20; Parfitt, supra note 11; Wingrove, supra note 16; Biggins v. Biggins (28
January 2000), (Ch.Div.).
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has been pleaded in conjunction with other doctrines which have often
determined the case.3' Indeed, it is arguable that undue influence has
become a principle subordinate to other doctrines because it is so difficult
to prove. It is likely that a pleading of undue influence will be coupled
with allegations that the testator lacked testamentary capacity 32; that there
were suspicious circumstances requiring proof that the testator knew and
approved of the terms of the will3 ; that there was no compliance with
the formalities34 ; or that there was fraud.35 Allegations of testamentary
undue influence are, for example, often coupled with allegations of lack of
testamentary capacity or the suspicious circumstances rule because a party
who challenges on either of these bases bears an evidential, rather than
a legal burden of proof.36 Moreover, it may be less difficult to challenge
the capacity of the testator than to prove that the testator was coerced into
making the will37 or to infer lack of knowledge and approval than to prove
the perpetration of undue influence.38
2. In modern Canadian case law
Canadian courts have not been as consistent and coherent in their approach
to testamentary undue influence as their English counterparts. This is
reflected in the discussion of testamentary undue influence in Feeney '
Canadian Law of Wills 39 where the author's description of the doctrine
combines elements of the traditional doctrine already outlined with modem
glosses on and significant departures from it.4° It is arguable that there
is more than one formulation of testamentary undue influence currently
operating in Canada.
31. E.g. Vaughan v. Vaughan [2002] EWHC 699 (Ch. D) [Vaughan].
32. E.g. Baudains, supra note 11; Vaughan, ibid.; Carapeto v. Good, [2002] W.T.L.R. 801, [2002]
E.W.H.C. 640 (Ch.D.) aff'd [2002] E.W.C.A.Civ. 944 (C.A.Civ.Div.) [Carapeto].
33. E.g. In the Estate ofBarlow (Deceased); Haydon v. Pring (1918), [1919] P. 14 aff'd as to merits
[1919] P. 131 (C.A.); Mills v. Colman (5 February 1985), (C.A.Civ.Div); Vaughan, supra note 31;
Carapeto, supra note 32.
34. Clark & Ross Martyn, supra note 26 at c. 4; Margrave-Jones, supra note 23, c. 6; Kerridge,
Parry & Clark, supra note 11 at c. 4; In the Estate of Barlow (Deceased); Haydon v. Pring, supra note
33; Mills v. Colman, supra note 33.
35. Clark & Ross Martyn, supra, note 26 at 41-42; Kerridge, Parry & Clark, supra note I I at para.
5-14.
36. Clark & Ross Martyn, supra note 26 at 42; Margrave-Jones, supra note 23 at para. 5.50.
37. E.g. Vaughan, supra note 31.
38. E.g. Wintle v. Nye (1958), [1959] 1 All E.R. 552, [1959] 1 W.L.R. 284 (H.L.).
39. James MacKenzie, Feeney's Canadian Law of Wills, 4 1h ed. Looseleaf (Toronto: LexisNexis
Butterworths, 2000).
40. Ibid. c. 3 B.
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Initially the Canadian law followed the traditional approach to
testamentary undue influence4 and there are still some recent cases where
the traditional approach and authorities have been followed.42 In particular,
Canadian courts have cited the decision of the House of Lords in Boyse43
and the decision of the Privy Council in Craig v. Lamoureux ('Craig)."
The latter case was an appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court of
Canada45 in which the Privy Council confirmed that a presumption of
undue influence is not part of the principle of testamentary undue influence
in Canada and that it is not incumbent on a beneficiary who assists in
the making of a will to demonstrate that a testator had not been subject
to undue influence. 6 Canadian courts have since held that testamentary
undue influence addresses some form of coercive conduct, 47 cannot be
presumed simply from the facts48 and is more than mere persuasion.49 The
41. Consider Hull & Hull, supra note 13 at 44-46; I.M. Hull, Challenging the Validity of Wills
(Toronto: Carswell, 1996) at 25-26; A.H. Oosterhoff, "Testamentary Capacity, Suspicious
Circumstances and Undue Influence" (1999) 18 E. & T. J. 369 at 361-382. In respect to the nineteenth
century see, e.g., Adams v. McBeath (1897), 27 S.C.R. 13 [Adams]. In respect to the twentieth century
see, e.g., Kaulbach v. Archbold Estate (1901), 31 S.C.R. 387; Riach v. Ferris, [1935] 1 D.L.R. 118,
[1934] S.C.R. 725 (S.C.C.) [Riach]; Re Martin; MacGregor v. Ryan (1965), 53 D.L.R. (2d) 126,
[1965] S.C.R. 757; Doherty v. Doherty (1997), (sub nom. Doherty Estate, Re), 190 N.B.R. (2d) 303,
484 A.P.R. 303, 19 E.T.R. (2d) 158 (N.B.C.A.) [Doherty]; Banton v. Banton (1998), 164 D.L.R. (4')
176 (Ont. Gen. Div.); Stevens v. Crawford (2000), 31 E.T.R. (2d) 268, 256 A.R. 254 (Alta. Surr. Ct.);
Bates v. Finley Estate (2002), 43 ETR (2d) I (B.C.S.C.).
42. E.g. Neyedley v. Neyedley Estate (2004), 9 E.T.R. (3d) 135,250 Sask.R. 38, [2005] 3 W.W.R. 669
(Sask.Q.B.).
43. Supra note 9. Cases in which Boyse has been cited or quoted include: Adams, supra note 41;
National Trust Co v. Taylor, [1922] 68 D.L.R. 339 (Man.K.B.) aff'd, [1923] 3 D.L.R. 1196 (Man.
C.A.); Riach, supra note 41; Re Kaufman (1961), 27 D.L.R. (2d) 178 (Ont. C.A.) (sub nom. Anderson
v. Walkey) [Re Kaufman]; Fieldv. James (2001), 38 E.T.R. (2d) 8 & 151, 87 B.C.L.R. (3d) 235, [2001]
5 W.W.R. 299 (B.C.C.A.).
44. Supra note 11. Craig has been considered in Riach, supra note 41; Re Martin; MacGregor v.
Ryan, supra note 41; Bishop v. Fleet, [1989] N.J. No. 129 (S.C. Nfld. T.D); Vout v. Hay (1995) 125
D.L.R. (4") 431, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 876, 7 E.T.R. 209 (S.C.C.) [Vout cited to D.L.R.]; Doherty, supra
note 41; Scott v. Cousins (2001), 37 E.T.R. (2d) 113 (Ont. Sup. Ct.).
45. Craig, supra note 11.
46. Ibid. at 356-357, 14-15.
47. E.g. Riach, supra note 41; Re Kaufman, supra note 43 at 189, Schroeder J.A.; Eady v. Waring
(1974), 43 D.L.R. (3d) 667 (Ont. C.A.) at 677, the trial judge, Dunlap J., quoted at length by Amup
J.A; Doherty, supra note 41 at paras. 25-27, Ayles J.A; Banton v. Banton (1998), 164 D.L.R. (4')
176 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at 208, Cullity J.; Stevens v. Crawford (2000), 31 E.T.R. (2d) 268, 256 A.R. 254
(Alta. Surr. Ct.) at paras. 286-287, Belzil J.; Bates v. Finley Estate, supra note 41 at para. 129, Drost
J.; Huculak v. Smetanuik Estate (2005), 14 E.T.R. (3d) 275 (B.C.S.C.) at 35, Barrow J.
48. E.g. Adams, supra note 41 at 18, Sedgewick J.; Wannamaker v. Livingston (1918),43 O.L.R. 243
(Ont. A.D.) at para. 67, Ferguson J.A; Pocock v. Pocock (1951), [1952] O.R. 155 (Ont. C.A) at paras.
43-44, Aylesworth J.A; Banton v. Banton, supra note 47 at 209, Cullity J.; Re Wyker Estate (2003), 1
E.T.R. (3d) 312, 338 A.R. 323 at para. 17, Clarke J.
49. E.g. Kaulbach v. Archbold Estate, supra note 41; Re Crompton, Crompton v. Williams, [ 1938] 4
D.L.R. 237 (Ont. S.C.), Rose C.J.H.C.
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party challenging the will5° has to show that undue influence was exercised
and that it is the only possible explanation of the testator's actions." The
costs of the action are to be borne by the unsuccessful party who challenged
the will.52
The adoption of the traditional model of testamentary undue influence
in a significant number of Canadian cases ensured that the utility of the
doctrine was limited. As in England, concerns about the sufficiency of
evidence to prove traditional testamentary undue influence53 led parties
to raise other doctrines in conjunction with undue influence such as lack
of testamentary capacity,54 lack of compliance with formalities55 and
the suspicious circumstances rule. 56 This sometimes led courts to deal
summarily with allegations of undue influence57 or not to deal with these
allegations at all. 8 Nevertheless, compared to English authorities, some
early Canadian cases indicated that judges were beginning to recognize
testamentary undue influence in situations where the improper influence
fell short of coercion or could not be proved directly. However, these
developments did not undermine or modify the traditional model.
50. E.g. Riach, supra note 41; Re Kaufman, supra note 43 at 192, Schroeder J.A.; Re Martin;
MacGregor v. Ryan, supra note 41; Vout, supra note 44 at 441; Doherty, supra note 41 at paras. 25-27,
Ayles J.A.
51. E.g. Adams, supra note 41 at 18, Sedgewick J.; Standard Trusts Co v. Pulice (1922), 70 D.L.R. 145
(B.C.C.A.) at 150, McPhillips J.A; Re Kaufman, supra note 43 at 190, Schroeder I.A.; Carleton v.
Goldstone (1981), 13 Sask. R. 297 (Sask. Surr. Ct.) at para. 43, McIntyre J.; Bishop v. Fleet, supra note
44 at 13, Adams J.; Re 14Wyker Estate, supra note 48 at para. 17, Clarke J; Hull, supra note 41 at 26.
52. E.g. Maben v. Urquhart (1968), 1 D.L.R. (3d) 413; Stewart v. McLean (2003), 49 E.T.R. (2d)
294, 337 A.R. 164 (Alta. Q.B.).
53. There were only a few cases where undue influence was solely pleaded or the predominant
focus of the case, e.g., Adams, supra note 41; Wannamaker v. Livingston, supra note 48; Craig, supra
note 11; Pocock v. Pocock (1951), supra note 48; Christie v. Christie (1983), 20 A.C.W.S. (2d) 242
(B.C.S.C.).
54. E.g. Re Martin; MacGregor v. Ryan, supra note 41; Re Kaufman, supra note 43; Eady v. Waring,
supra note 47; Archer v. Clower (1981), 11 A.C.W.S. (2d) 484 (B.C.S.C.); Re Meikle Estate (1988), 9
A.C.W.S. (3d) 230 (Ont. Surr. Ct.); Bishop v. Fleet, supra note 44; Jurney Estate v. Jurney, [1990] A.J.
No. 1110 (Alta. Surr. Ct.).
55. E.g. Campbell Estate v. Chitrenky, [1981] A.J. No. 595 Surr. 56933 (Alta. Surr. Ct.); Dalziel v.
Bradford, [1985] B.C.J. No. 2754 (B.C.S.C.); Biggins v. Rock, [1990] O.J. No. 601.
56. E.g. Re Kaufman, supra note 43; Re Mann Estate (1981), 33 A.R. 144 (Alta. Q.B.); Doyle v.
Valente (1993), 40 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1024 (B.C.S.C).
57. E.g. Kostynuik v. Brychun, [1982] S.J. No. 726 (Sask. Surr. Ct.) at para. 39, Maher Surr. Ct. J.;
Watson v. Watson (2004), 14 E.T.R. (3d) 181 (B.C.S.C.) at para. 72 (Wilson J.); Re Poulos Estate,
[1991] O.J. No. 366 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at para. 29, Potts J.; Bayne v. Bartlett (2004), 234 Nfld & P.E.I.R.
267, 6 E.T.R. (3d) 171 (N.L.S.C) at para. 121, Hall J.
58. E.g. Salvation Army Canada West v. Allen Estate (1988), 10 A.C.W.S. (3d) 250 (B.C.S.C.) at
para. 53, Oppal J.; Bunio v. Bunio Estate (2 March 1984), [2005] Alta. D. 970.90.75.80-01 (Alta.
Q.B.) at para. 31, Gill J; Sheen v. Sheen (2003), 49 E.T.R. (2d) 114 at para. 23 Glowacki J. aff'd
(2004), 11 E.T.R.(3d) 70, 190 Man.R. (2d) 51 at para. 13 (Man. C.A).
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a. Wrongdoing coupled with a relationship of control
Courts identified a situation where a testator steadily fell under the
influence of the potential beneficiary who significantly controlled the
testator's affairs, falsely informed the testator about his circumstances and
influenced the terms of the will. In Re Kaufinan59 Schroeder J.A. described
the situation as:
...not fraud in the strict sense, but a subtle species of fraud involving the
making of false and insidious suggestions whereby mastery was obtained
by the defendant... over the mind of the testator; that the particular fraud
was something which was used.. .as the means of acquiring an undue
influence over the testator and as an efficient aid in its exercise.60
It is arguable that this is simply an example of the relationship of control
identified by Lord Cranworth in Boyse where the testator is not a free agent
and a court holds that undue influence has in fact been exercised, even in
the absence of direct evidence of coercion.6 Certainly, some Canadian
commentators have recognized this aspect of Boyse.62 However, the
threshold set in such cases as Re Kaufman63 was arguably higher than the
threshold set down by Lord Cranworth because Canadian courts assumed
wrongdoing in the making of the will in addition to undue influence within
a broader relationship of control. Therefore, the recognition of situations in
Canadian cases where influence was used improperly in what constituted
relationships of control ought not be overstated. Some courts insisted
that there had to be evidence not only of coercion, but also of illegal or
illegitimate coercion,' although this distinction was not made in Boyse
and Craig.
b. The suspicious circumstances rule and undue influence
In England, the use of the suspicious circumstances rule to cover situations
of possible coercion and undue influence is still emerging and has been
criticized.65 In contrast, Canadian courts have encouraged the application
of the suspicious circumstances rule in situations where the possibility
or likelihood of testamentary undue influence reinforces the conclusion
that the testator did not know and approve the will. The mere possibility
of undue influence inferred from the facts of the case may trigger the
59. Supra note 43.
60. Ibid. at 190. See also Re 7imlick v. Crawford (1965), 53 W.W.R 87 (B.C.S.C.); Re Crompton,
Crompton v. Williams, supra note 49.
61. Boyse, supra note 9 at 51, 1212.
62. Hull & Hull, supra note 13 at 46.
63. Supra note 43.
64. National Trust Co v. Taylor, [1922] 68 D.L.R. 339 (Man. K.B.), aff'd [1923)] 3 D.L.R. 1196
(Man. C.A.); Brownhill Estate, [1986] N.S.J. No. 513 (N.S.Co.C.).
65. Kerridge, "Suspicious Circumstances," supra note 1 at 324-325.
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suspicious circumstances rule without the need to prove actual coercion.
If the propounder of the will cannot prove the testator's knowledge and
approval of the contents of the will, then the court will refuse probate of
the will. The Canadian courts have not, however, endorsed an approach
in which mere trivial suspicions of undue influence will be a sufficient
basis to prevent probate. Otherwise, the application of the suspicious
circumstances rule would arguably undermine the rigour of the traditional
doctrine of testamentary undue influence.
In order to understand the scope of the rule, Canadian courts and
litigants have consistently returned to the early descriptions of the
suspicious circumstances rule. In one of the seminal English cases
establishing the rule, Barry v. Butlin ('Barry'), 66 Parke B. stated that the
propounder "must satisfy the conscience of the Court that the instrument
so propounded is the last Will of a free and capable Testator. ' 67 The crucial
word in the statement is "free." The question is whether the propounder
of the will not only bears the obligation of demonstrating testamentary
capacity and knowledge and approval, but also whether the testatrix is
"free" so that she has not been subjected to undue influence in the making
of the will. If the propounder of the will is required to prove that the
testator was "free," the propounder, rather than the person challenging the
will, bears the legal burden of establishing that the testator was not subject
to coercion. 68 In Barry, Parke B. also indicated that the rule would apply
where a beneficiary "writes or prepares a Will, under which he takes a
benefit. '69 The question is whether the suspicious circumstances rule is
only activated when the beneficiary has participated in the making of the
will or whether other well-grounded suspicions trigger the rule.
The Canadian Supreme Court considered these issues in several
important cases in the twentieth century.7 ° In the most recent authority,
Vout v. Hay ('Vout') 7 the Supreme Court not only endorsed the earlier
decisions, but also further elaborated the nature of the evidence that will
support the suspicious circumstances rule. In Vout an elderly testator
appointed his friend, Vout, as executor and left significant assets to her.
She had been involved in the making of the will, although the extent
66. (1838), 2 Moo. P.C. 480; 12 E.R. 1089 (P.C.) [Barry] Note also Hull & Hull, supra note 13 at
38-44; Oosterhoff, supra note 41 at 385-388.
67. Barry, ibid. at 482-483, 1090.
68. See R.W. Gifford, "Will or No Will? The Effect of Fraud and Undue Influence on Testamentary
Instruments" (1920) 20 Colum. L. Rev. 862 at 874-880; C.A. Wright, "Case and Comment" (1938) 16
Can. Bar Rev. 405 at 411-412.
69. Supra note 66 at 482-483, 1090.
70. E.g. Riach, supra note 41; Re Martin; MacGregor v. Ryan, supra note 41. See Hull, supra note
41 at 26-30.
71. Vout, supra note 44. See Oosterhoff, supra note 41 at 388-392.
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of her participation was unclear.72 The trial judge held that at the time
of the execution of the will, the testator had testamentary capacity and
that he had made the will he intended to make.73 On the other hand, the
Ontario Court of Appeal held that there had been suspicious circumstances
surrounding the execution of the will that had not been adequately taken
into account by the trial judge and that these suspicious circumstances cast
the burden of disproving undue influence on Vout.74 The Supreme Court of
Canada held that the Court of Appeal had erred and allowed the appeal.75
Sopinka J. who delivered the judgment of the Supreme Court confirmed
that the suspicious circumstances rule can be triggered by circumstances
surrounding the preparation of the will which tend to call into question the
capacity of the testator or tend to show that the free will of the testator was
overborne by acts of coercion or fraud.76 Nevertheless, while a suspicion
of undue influence can trigger the suspicious circumstances rule, the Court
determined that the traditional doctrine of testamentary undue influence
still separately applies. Sopinka J. observed:
It might have been simpler to apply the same principles to the issue of
fraud and undue influence as to cast the legal burden onto the propounder
in the presence of suspicious circumstances.. .Indeed, the references in
Barry v. Butlin to the will of a "free and capable" testator would have
supported that view. Nevertheless, the principle has become firmly
entrenched that fraud and undue influence are to be treated as an affirmative
defence to be raised by those attacking the will. They, therefore, bear
the legal burden of proof No doubt this reflects the policy in favour
of honouring the wishes of the testator where it is established that the
formalities have been complied with, and knowledge and approval as
well as testamentary capacity have been established. To disallow probate
by reason of circumstances merely raising a suspicion of fraud or undue
influence would tend to defeat the wishes of the testator in many cases
where in fact no fraud or undue influence existed, but the propounder
simply failed to discharge the legal burden.77
Sopinka J. acknowledged that there could be an overlap between the
suspicious circumstances rule (triggered by concerns about possible
coercion) and undue influence in the form of coercion. Accordingly, he
pointed out that in many cases when the testator has knowledge of and
approves of the contents of the will, it will be difficult to find that the
72. Vout, ibid. at 433-434.
73. Ibid. at 436. See Oosterhoff, supra note 41 at 389-381.
74. Ibid. at 436-437. See Oosterhoff, supra note 41 at 389-38 1.
75. Ibid. at 436-442.
76. Ibid. at 439.
77. Ibid. at 440-441.
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testator had been subject to coercion. 7 Nevertheless, he maintained that
there was a significant difference between the suspicious circumstances
rule and traditional testamentary undue influence. The latter is based on
coercive conduct that may not be counterbalanced by proof of knowledge
and approval. As Sopinka J. remarked, a testator "may well appreciate
what he or she is doing but be doing it as a result of coercion or fraud."79
In such a situation, it is futile to rely on the suspicious circumstances
rule, because the propounder will be able to discharge the legal burden
of proving knowledge and approval. The person challenging the will still
bears the legal and evidential burden of proving undue influence directly
in the form of coercion.
3. The "unintended gap" as a result of the traditional doctrine
Significant problems exist regarding the application and utility of the
traditional model of testamentary undue influence in England and Canada.
The doctrine has been strictly constructed and applied in English cases
and in a large number of Canadian cases. It has been extremely difficult
to satisfy courts that not only was there coercion, but that coercion is the
only possible explanation for the existence of the will.
The narrow interpretation of testamentary undue influence has also
led to a significant and possibly "unintended gap" in the courts' power
to refuse probate. The comments by Sopinka J. in Vout 8° highlight the
problem. Testamentary capacity and the suspicious circumstances rule,
in particular, may be used helpfully in factual situations where undue
influence may be suspected, but cannot be proved. For example, there may
be evidence suggesting that the testator lacked testamentary capacity. The
propounder of the will may be unable to assuage a court's concerns about
the testator's capacity and the court refuses to admit the will to probate.
The fact that testamentary undue influence is raised but not proved does
not matter because the will has been successfully challenged, albeit on
another basis.
It must be emphasized, however, that a finding that the testator lacked
testamentary capacity or knowledge and approval of the will does not test
the contention that there was some form of wrongdoing perpetrated in the
form of undue influence. It merely results in the court refusing to grant
probate. Therefore, it would be erroneous to assume that the application
78. Ibid. at441.
79. Ibid. at 442. See also the seminal English decision in respect to inter vivos undue influence in
Huguenin v. Baseley (1807), 14 Ves. Jun. 273 at 300; 33 E.R. 526 at 536, Lord Eldon (Ch.); and M.
Silberfeld, "Susceptibility to Undue Influence in the Mentally Impaired" (2002) 21 E. & T.J. 331 at
340-341.
80. Ibid. at 442.
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of other doctrines can always offset the inherent limitations of traditional
testamentary undue influence. The facts of a particular case, even if the
situation may be considered highly unusual or irregular, may neither
attract an allegation or finding of testamentary incapacity, nor raise facts
rebutting the presumption of knowledge and approval. For example, in
Vout both the trial judge and the Supreme Court of Canada held that the
testator possessed testamentary capacity and knew and approved the will.
There was no evidence that the testator had been subject to coercion.8"
Accordingly, the central issue is whether it is possible to reform the
law and deal with the "unintended gap."
III. Pathways of reform
The proposals for reform fall into two broad classes. The first imposes
a rebuttable presumption of undue influence that is triggered in certain
circumstances. In England, academic commentators and law reform
committees have recommended a rebuttable presumption of undue
influence. In Canada, the endorsement and adoption of a rebuttable
presumption appears to have occurred principally in case law, although
recently there has been some academic support. The second kind of
reform has arisen from a series of cases in which Canadian judges have
not imposed a presumption of undue influence, but have applied modem,
practical and more achievable evidential standards than those traditionally
prescribed.
1. The imposition of a rebuttable presumption of undue influence in
testamentary cases
The notion that insufficient direct evidence ought not to necessarily bar
a finding that undue influence was, in fact, perpetrated is not new. In the
eighteenth century the Court of Chancery decided that in some inter vivos
transactions there was a "kind of fraud.. .which may be presumed from the
circumstances and condition of the parties contracting."82 This observation
laid the basis for what has become known as "equitable undue influence"83
or a rebuttable presumption of undue influence with respect to inter
vivos gifts and contracts. There are also jurisdictions that have adopted
such a rebuttable presumption in probate cases.8 4 Modem proposals for
a rebuttable presumption of undue influence in England and Canada are
underpinned by the view that parties challenging the validity of a will on
81. Vout, supra note 44 at 443, Sopinka J. See Carapeto, supra note 32.
82. Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen (1751), 2 Ves. Sen. 125 at 155 (Ch.); 28 E.R. 82 at 100. Note Earl
ofAylesford v. Morris (1873) 8 Ch. App. 484 at 491, Lord Selborne L.C.
83. Ridge, supra note 1.
84. In this respect, Scotland: see D.R. McDonald, Succession, 3rd ed. (Edinburgh: W. Green/Sweet
& Maxwell, 2001) at paras. 8.31-8.33.
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the basis of undue influence bear an unrealistically high evidential onus to
prove coercion85 and that there are no good policy reasons why inter vivos
and testamentary gifts ought to be treated differently.86
Any rebuttable presumption of undue influence, whether in an inter
vivos or testamentary context, has three components.
a. A rebuttable presumption shifting the onus ofproof
The existence of a rebuttable presumption has a significant effect upon
the evidence required, the burden of proof and the party who bears the
burden of proof. Under the traditional doctrine of testamentary undue
influence, the party challenging the will alone bears the burden of proving
actual undue influence. Unless there is firm evidence of coercion, courts
will grant probate, even if there are concerns about undue influence. In
contrast, if there is a rebuttable presumption of undue influence, the party
challenging the will is only required to provide sufficient evidence to raise
the presumption. It will not be necessary to prove actual undue influence,
but only evidence from which a rebuttable presumption of undue influence
can be rationally inferred. The propounder of the will or the beneficiary
then bears the burden of positively demonstrating that the testator made
the will free from undue influence,87 even where it has been demonstrated
that the testator possessed testamentary capacity and knew and approved
of the terms of the will.
In both England and Canada, however, courts have endorsed the
principle that the party challenging the will bears the burden of proving
undue influence; courts in both jurisdictions have not supported a literal
interpretation88 of the view of Parke B. that the propounder of the will
is required to prove that the deceased was a free testator.89 Indeed, it is
arguable that the effect of a rebuttable presumption would be to re-instate
indirectly a proposition which the courts have not embraced directly. The
extent to which the suspicious circumstances rule would remain useful in
such cases is also unclear.90 It is arguable that it would be more attractive to
85. Kerridge, "Suspicious Circumstances," supra note 1 at 324-325 & 327-328; Ridge, supra note 1
at 621-623.
86. D.R. Klinck, "Does the Presumption of Undue Influence Arise in the Testamentary Context?"
(2005) 24 E. & T.J. 125; Ridge, supra note 1 at 627-634.
87. E.g. Royal Bank of Scotland plc v. Etridge (No. 2) (2001), [2002] 2 A.C. 773 (H.L.) at 796-797,
Lord Nicholls; Geffen v. Goodman Estate (1991), 81 D.L.R. (4"') 211, [1991] S.C.R. 353 (S.C.C.)
[Geffen cited to D.L.R.] at 228, Wilson J.
88. Consider Vout, supra note 44 at 440, Sopinka J.
89. Supra note 9 at 482-483, 1090.
90. Baker suggests that the suspicious circumstances rule is the link between the traditional doctrine
of testamentary undue influence and the presumption of undue influence: Baker, supra note 18 at
448.
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rely on a rebuttable presumption than evidence that triggers the suspicious
circumstances rule.
It has been argued that a presumption of undue influence may be more
justified in a testamentary context than in an inter vivos situation because
"exploiters might be more inclined to refrain from depredations in the inter
vivos context by the very fact that their victims might still be alive and be
able to expose them."'" However, the problem with applying a rebuttable
presumption of undue influence in a testamentary context is that it could
be used strategically to prevent the grant of probate of a will which in all
other aspects appears valid. It is strongly arguable that in Boyse, Lord
Cranworth set the standard of proving undue influence too high.92 The use
of a rebuttable presumption could have the opposite effect because it would
arise on the mere inference of undue influence, shift the onus of proof and
adversely affect the validity of the will. The result would be that an earlier
will or intestacy legislation would govern the distribution of assets in a
way that could be entirely at odds with the testator's intention. The concept
of a rebuttable presumption is used in other contexts in testamentary cases,
but it is applied to presume validity rather than invalidity. For example, in
both jurisdictions there are initial rebuttable presumptions of capacity and
knowledge and approval if the will complies with the formalities and is
rational on its face.93
Raising a rebuttable presumption of undue influence when the key
witness, the testator, is unavailable to give evidence is also fraught with
difficulties. A will is ambulatory and does not take effect until the death
of the testator. Unlike an inter vivos transaction, the provisions in the will
cannot improvidently affect the testator during his lifetime 94 (except to
the extent that the testator may know that the will does not reflect his true
desires).95 In most inter vivos cases the donor is alive and has a practical
interest in the outcome of any case. She often brings the action and may
give evidence about her relationship with the donee and the events that
led to the making of the gift or transaction. Conversely, in testamentary
cases, the party who challenges the will generally does so because the will
does not provide the expected inheritance. She may be aggrieved if the
testator was subjected to undue influence, but in most cases it is unlikely
91. Klinck, supra note 86 at 137.
92. Boyse, supra note 9 at 51, 1212.
93. In respect to England see, e.g., Barry, supra note 66; Wintle v. Nye, supra note 38. In regard to
Canada see Vout, supra note 44 at 440, Sopinka J.
94. Lifetime gifts are optional, while property must devolve after death: Kerridge, Parry & Clark,
supra note 11 at para. 5-34, n. 25.
95. Klinck, supra note 86 at 137.
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she would initiate expensive litigation without the prospect of acquiring
property under an earlier will or on an intestacy.
b. Triggers of a rebuttable presumption
A rebuttable presumption of undue influence must specify what kind
of relationship between the donor and the donee or what kinds of
conditions surrounding the making of the gift trigger the presumption.
These "triggers" do not focus on the testator's testamentary capacity
or knowledge and approval of the will. Rather, they suggest that the
exercise of testamentary intention was impaired by the exercise of undue
influence.9 6 Three potential triggers are discussed below.
A gift made in a tightly defined relationship
A narrow form of a rebuttable presumption of undue influence in a
testamentary context was suggested by the Committee on Civil Justice
in the United Kingdom. 97 The Committee recommended that a rebuttable
presumption of undue influence should apply when a will was made in
favour of a beneficiary providing residential care under contract such as
the owner and operator of a nursing home.98 Although wills made in favour
of such parties have been challenged on the basis of undue influence, 99 it
is a difficult policy decision to impose a rebuttable presumption of undue
influence for some relationships and not others. 100 A selection of specific
relationships may convey the impression that testamentary gifts made in
the context of other relationships are benign. It is true that in England'01
and Canada'012 a presumption of undue influence operates for inter vivos
transfers in settled categories of influence such as solicitor-client, doctor-
patient and religious advisor and advisee relationships. In addition,
96. See Huguenin v. Baseley, supra note 79 at 300, 536, Lord Eldon (Ch.).
97. Justice, Home-Made Wills (London: Charles Knight & Co Ltd, 1971). Justice is the name of the
British Section of the International Commission of Jurists.
98. Ibid. at 4 & 7-8. See the facts in Timlick v. Crawford, supra note 60.
99. E.g. Re Stott (deceased); Klouda v. Lloyds Bank Ltd, supra note 28; Kerridge, "Suspicious
Circumstances," supra note 1 at 326-328.
100. Kerridge, "Suspicious Circumstances," ibid. at 331.
101. Barclays Bankplc v. O'Brien 1993, [1994] 1 A.C. 180 (H.L.) at 189-190, Lord Browne-Wilkinson.
In Royal Bank of Scotland plc v. Etridge (No. 2), supra note 87 the House of Lords pointed out that
this constituted an irrebuttable presumption that the ascendant party was in a position to influence the
weaker party. The court would set aside the transaction unless the ascendant party proved that there
was no influence: 797, Lord Nicholls. See generally: L.A. Sheridan, Fraud in Equity (London: Sir
Isaac Pitman & Sons Ltd, 1957) at 87-96; M. Cope, Duress, Undue Influence and Unconscientious
Bargains (Sydney: The Law Book Company Ltd, 1985) at paras. 168-187.
102. Geffen, supra note 87 at 221, Wilson J.
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however, courts have recognized that a rebuttable presumption of undue
influence can also arise in the particular circumstances of the case.° 3
A gift is made in a situation where a rebuttable presumption of
undue influence arises in inter vivos cases
Some judges and commentators have suggested that the rebuttable
presumption of undue influence that operates in inter vivos transactions
ought to be incorporated into probate law. Academic commentators have
made such a recommendation in England, while in Canada some judges,
after the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Geffen v. Goodman
('Geffen'),'O° have recognized a rebuttable presumption. Because the
nature of the relationship that triggers the rebuttable presumption of
undue influence in inter vivos cases differs in England and Canada, it is
appropriate to deal with these jurisdictions separately.
England. a relationship of trust and confidence
Writing in the English context, Ridge is representative of those who
support the incorporation of the inter vivos rebuttable presumption (or
"equitable undue influence") into probate law. She has argued that this
is the best way to protect testators. 05 The proposition is not new. Ridge's
recommendation is the latest in a series of similar proposals made by
judges, 10 6 commentators'07 and law reformers, 08 and appears comparable
with the convergence of inter vivos and testamentary undue influence in
one Commonwealth jurisdiction.'0 9
For Ridge, a presumption of undue influence can be achieved by either
directly incorporating the inter vivos presumption into probate law or
effectively doing so by the imposition of a trust established after probate
is granted"0 on the basis of equitable undue influence. The test currently
employed in England to determine whether a rebuttable presumption of
103. In England the House of Lords pointed out in Royal Bank ofScotlandplc v. Etridge (No. 2), supra
note 87 that this is merely an evidentiary presumption in favour of the plaintiff that the defendant used
undue influence to procure the transaction: at 797, Lord Nicholls. In respect to Canada see Geffen,
supra note 87 at 221-222, Wilson J.
104. Geffen, supra note 87.
105. See generally Ridge, supra note 1.
106. E.g. the colonial Australian judgments of Hargrave J. in Buckley v. Millar[ 1869] S.R.C. (N.S.W.)
Eq. 74 (N.S.W.S.C.) at 91-93; Callaghan v. Myers (1880), 1 N.S.W.R. 351 (N.S.W.S.C) at 357.
107. Baker, supra note 18.
108. New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Wills, Execution and Revocation No. 47 (Sydney,
N.S.W. Government, 1986) at para. 8.34; Ridge, supra note I at 626.
109. In respect to Scotland see McDonald, supra note 84 at paras. 8.25-8.33.
110. Ridge, supra note 1 at 634-638.
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undue influence operates in an inter vivos context would be adopted. " '
Consistent with this test, Ridge has proposed that where a testamentary
gift is made in favour of a person in a strong relationship of trust and
confidence with the testator and the gift is not readily explicable by the
ordinary motives by which people act, a factual inference of actual undue
influence should be raised."2 If a presumption arises, then the beneficiary
will bear the burden of demonstrating that the testator was able to "exercise
an independent will" and that the gift "was the result of a free exercise
of his will." '113 The advantage of applying the inter vivos presumption
is that it is a more flexible tool in cases where there are suspicions of
undue influence but insufficient evidence of coercion. Although she has
recognized that there may be difficulties adapting a presumption of undue
influence based on a relationship of trust and confidence in testamentary
situations," 4 she has downplayed the impediments.
Ridge has argued that the different approaches to testamentary and
inter vivos gifts are principally the outcome of the pre-judicature system
of separate courts that came to an end in the nineteenth century. "5 Seen
in this light, it is incongruous that whether the gift is contained in a deed
or a will determines whether coercion or broader presumptive notions of
undue influence apply.116 The apparent inconsistency of imposing two
different standards is illustrated where a person makes an inter vivos gift
and dies soon after. The executor or administrator of the deceased's estate
may challenge the inter vivos transaction relying on a presumption of
undue influence because the transaction was entered into and took effect
while the deceased was still alive. " 7 One of the common arguments for
retaining the traditional approach to testamentary undue influence is that
the testator is no longer alive and is unable to bring an action or give
evidence. "8 However, the explanation is also tenable when the donor of an
inter vivos gift is dead yet a different rule applies. As both the inter vivos
and testamentary transactions are gifts and the donor is dead, there appears
111. Relying on the decision of the House of Lords in Royal Bank of Scotland v. Etridge (No. 2),
supra note 87 at 796-797, Lord Nicholls.
112. Ridge, supra note I at 619.
113. Ibid. Ridge quotes from Goldsworthy v. Brickell, [1987] Ch. 378 at 402, Nourse L.J.
114. Ridge, supra note I at 627-634.
115. See F.W. Maitland, Equity: A Course of Lectures, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1947) at 15-17.
116. Consider, e.g., Baker, supra note 18 at 449; Klinck, supra note 86 at 136-140; M. Tyson "An
Analysis of the Differences between the Doctrine of Undue Influence with respect to Testamentary and
Inter Vivos Dispositions (1997) 5 Aust. Prop. L.J. 38 at 48.
117. Ridge discusses the Australian High Court's decision in Bridgewater v. Leahy (1998), 194 C.L.R.
457 (H.C.A).
118. P. Vines, "Challenging the testator's mind by challenging lifetime transactions: Bridgewater v.
Leahy as Backdoor Probate Law" (2003) 10 Aust. Prop. L.J. 53 at 63.
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to be no reason for applying different principles. Instead, for Ridge the
adoption of the inter vivos presumption in testamentary cases would be the
most advantageous way of dealing with a serious anomaly that originated
in an artificial jurisdictional divide.
Judges and authors have disagreed with the kind of proposal Ridge has
made. In Parfitt v. Lawless'1 9 Lord Penzance refused to apply a rebuttable
presumption of undue influence in a relationship of trust and confidence
where there was a testamentary gift. He explained that a person accused
of undue influence in relation to a contract or inter vivos gift will have
participated in the making of that transaction. A beneficiary under a will
may not have taken part in the will-making process and may not be aware
of the gift. It is not justifiable to cast such a burden on a beneficiary.2 °
However, this is unconvincing in situations when the beneficiary is aware
of the terms of the will.'2'
Commentators have also observed that a testator is most likely to make
gifts to persons who fall within a relationship of trust and confidence with
the testator. 22 The result is that there could be a large number of wills which
would have to be proved in a formal manner, where such proof would not
otherwise be necessary. However, an equally compelling argument is that
the persons who would fall within a relationship of trust and confidence
are likely to be those who would exercise undue influence over testators. 123
In any event, relationships between spouses, and older parents and their
adult children, have not traditionally constituted relationships of trust and
confidence in English inter vivos undue influence cases. The existence
of the relationship itself satisfactorily explains the making of the gift.'24
Therefore, if the inter vivos rebuttable presumption were transposed into
a probate context, it is unlikely that gifts to spouses or children would
be scrutinized seriously. Yet there have been a number of probate cases
119. Supra note 11. Note also Ramcoomarsingh v. The Administrator General [2002] UKPC 67 (16
December 2002).
120. Ibid. at 469.
121. Klinck, supra note 86 at 135-136.
122. Margrave-Jones, supra note 23 at para. 5.47; J.G. Miller, The Machinery of Succession (London:
Professional Books Ltd, 1977) at 125.
123. See Klinck, supra note 86 at 136.
124. In respect to wives see: Royal Bank of Scotland plc v. Etridge (No. 2), supra note 87 at 800, Lord
Nicholls; and Sheridan, supra note 101 at 96. In respect to children see: Sheridan, supra note 101 at
93-94; Cope, supra note 101 at paras. 169-174; Fiona R. Bums, "Undue Influence Inter Vivos and the
Elderly" (2002) 26 Melbourne U.L. Rev. 499 at 509-5 10.
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in England and Canada where a spouse'25 or an adult child 26 has been
accused of exercising undue influence.
The major problem with the application of this presumption in a
testamentary context is that it might be used to defeat the true intention
of the testator on the basis of whether the testator did or did not act in
accordance with "social norms." Although such "social norms" may be
difficult to articulate, they are discernible in intestacy legislation'27 or in
the underlying principles restricting testamentary freedom in the form of
family provision legislation. 2 8 Both legislative schemes are based on the
view that spouses, issue and collateral relatives ought to benefit to some
extent from the deceased's estate. For example, there are some English
cases where gifts to spouses, 129 relatives 3 ' and friends 3' as beneficiaries
have been challenged on the basis of testamentary undue influence. If,
instead, the artificial framework of the rebuttable presumption based on a
relationship of trust and confidence were imposed, it is likely many wills
would be considered valid because they appear explicable "by the ordinary
motives by which people act," rather than by any analysis of the particular
circumstances of the case. On the other hand, substantial gifts to formal
care-givers, 132 housekeepers'33 and informal care-givers' 34 have been
challenged by relatives of the testator. It might be argued that the gift in
favour of care-givers or housekeepers to the disadvantage of the relatives
is inexplicable "by the ordinary motives by which people act." Yet, there
may be good reasons why the testator decided to leave substantial assets to
such persons, although the testator may not have articulated these reasons
in the will or supplementary documentation. The testator may have
125. E.g. Boyse, supra note 9; Hall, supra note 20; Craig, supra note 11; Scott v. Cousins, supra note
44.
126. E.g. In the Estate of Wilkes (Deceased): Wilkes v. Ayres (8 June 2000) No. HC9902567 (Ch.
Div.), 2000 WL 33201465; Vaughan, supra note 31; Re Kohut Estate (1993), 90 Man. R. (2d) 245
(Man. Q.B.); Adams v. Adams (24 April 1997), Vol 18 Folio 5686 (S.C.Nfld. T.D.); Kaczmarczyk v.
Kaczmarczyk (1997), 33 O.T.C. 208 (Ont. Gen. Div.), aff'd (1998), 116 O.A.C. 343; Field v. James
(2001), 38 E.T.R. (2d) 8, 87 B.C.L.R. (3d) 235, [2001] 5 W.W.R. 299 (B.C.C.A.).
127. E.g. the Administration of Estates Act 1925 (U.K.); Margrave-Jones, supra note 23, cs. 12 & 13;
Kerridge, Parry & Clark, supra note 11 at c. 2.
128. E.g. Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependents) Act 1975 (U.K.); Margrave-Jones,
supra note 23, c. 14.
129. E.g. Boyse, supra note 9; Hall, supra note 20.
130. E.g. Re Cutcliffe (deceased); Le Duc v. Veness, supra note 17; Biggins v. Biggins, supra note 30;
Vaughan, supra note 31; Tchilingirian v. Ouzounian, [2003] All E.R. (D) 76 (Ch.Div.).
131. E.g. Jones v. Grady (7 February 2000), Smith Bernal (C.A.Civ. Div.).
132. E.g. Re Stott (deceased); Klouda v. Lloyds Bank Ltd, supra note 28; White v. McCamley (25
January 1999), CH 1997-W-No4169 (Ch.Div.).
133. E.g. Baudains, supra note 11; Carapeto, supra note 32.
134. E.g. Mills v. Colman, supra note 33; Re Killick (Deceased); Killick v. Poutney, supra note 25.
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considered that the relatives were not interested in his welfare... or less
needy than others or that circumstances had so changed that a new will
was warranted.' 36 In short, as relationships change, testamentary intentions
may change.
Canada: domination of the will of another
Many Canadian judges have adhered to the traditional model of testa-
mentary undue influence. Indeed, when invited to apply a rebuttable
presumption of undue influence, some courts have refused to do So. 137
Courts have also conscientiously differentiated between the rules
applicable to inter vivos and testamentary gifts, even when the inter vivos
and testamentary gifts were challenged in the same case. 3 ' The decision
of the Supreme Court of Canada in Vout in 1995 is an important precedent
for courts which have refused to impose a rebuttable presumption of undue
influence. In Vout the Court confirmed that a person challenging a will on
the basis of undue influence (as distinct from suspicious circumstances)
bears the legal and evidential burden of proving undue influence. 19
Nevertheless, in Canada in contrast to England, a few courts have
either appeared to adopt a rebuttable presumption of undue influence
in testamentary cases or have expressly done so. 4° The decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada in Geffen 14 1 in 1991 has been crucial in this
respect. While the judges in that case differed as to whether a rebuttable
presumption of undue influence arose on the facts of the inter vivos
transaction under review, 14 in a seminal statement Wilson J. broadly
describedthe kind ofrelationship that wouldtriggerarebuttablepresumption
of undue influence in inter vivos transactions. She observed:
when one really speaks of "influence" one is really referring to the
ability of one person to dominate the will of another, whether through
135. E.g. Re Massey Estate (1997), 160 N.S.R. (2d) 339, 473 A.P.R. 339 (N.S. Pro. Ct.) at para. 39,
Hall J.
136. E.g. Re Ramsay Estate, (2004) 10 E.T.R. (3d) 44 (N.S.Prob.Ct.) at para. 62, Wright J.
137. E.g. Doherty, supra note 41 at para. 26, Ayles J.A.; Banton, supra note 41 at 209, Cullity J.;
Stephens v. Austin (2003), 50 E.T.R (2d) 255 (B.C.S.C.) at paras. 162 & 166, Nielson J. In Dalziel v.
Bradford, supra note 55 at para. 46, McEachem C.J.S.C. differentiated between a person holding a
pre-existing fiduciary relationship with the testator and the traditional doctrine of testamentary undue
influence; cf. Klinck, supra note 86 at 127..
138. E.g. Streisfield v. Goodman (2001), 40 E.T.R. (2d) 98 (Ont. Sup. Ct.); Araujo v. Neto (2001), 40
E.T.R. (2d) 169 (B.C.S.C.); Tribe v. Farrell (2003), 4 E.T.R. (3d) 288 (B.C.SC).
139. Vout, supra, note 44 at 440-441, Sopinka J. See Banton, supra note 41 at 209, Cullity J.
140. Klinck, supra note 86 at 127-130.
141. Geffen, supra note 87.
142. Ibid Wilson and Cory JJ. at 228-230 held that the relationship between the parties triggered the
presumption of undue influence. La Forest and McLachlin JJ. at 249-25 1, and Sopinka J. at 243, held
that the presumption had not been raised.
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manipulation, coercion, or outright but subtle abuse of power... To
dominate the will of another simply means to exercise a persuasive
influence over him or her.
The first question to be addressed in all cases is whether the potential
for domination inheres to the nature of the relationship itself. The test
embraces those relationships which equity has already recognized as
giving rise to the presumption, such as solicitor and client, parent and
child, and guardian and ward, as well as other relationships of dependency
which defy easy categorization. 143
Wilson J. referred to the presumption covering "gifts and bequests" several
times in the judgment.'" However, her comments were made about an
inter vivos transaction regarding the legal principles governing inter vivos
transactions (as her historical reference to equity indicated). While it is
strongly arguable that Lord Cranworth alluded to something other than
coercion in Boyse, 14 5 the description of undue influence in Geffen extends
well beyond the traditional testamentary doctrine in two significant ways.
First, the exercise of a "persuasive influence" or "mere persuasion" does
not satisfy the traditional doctrine. 146 Second, the traditional testamentary
doctrine has required proof of coercion so that, generally, the mere ability
or opportunity to coerce has not been considered adequate evidence. 141
In the years preceding the decision in Geffen there were only a few
probate cases where trial judges appeared to adopt a rebuttable presumption
of undue influence based either on a relationship of control over the
deceased 14 or a relationship of trust and confidence. 14 Appellate courts
generally required, however, that the trial judges maintain the distinction
between inter vivos and testamentary undue influence and that there be
evidence of testamentary undue influence 150; or glossed over the reference
to a relationship of trust and confidence and held that undue influence had
not been proved.'5 '
In the years after the decision in Geffen, but before Vout, aspects of
the judgment of Wilson J. began to filter into some testamentary undue
143. Ibid. at 227, Wilson J. She also considered that a relationship of trust and confidence could
constitute a relationship of dominance.
144. Ibid. at 227-228; 230.
145. Supra note 9.
146. Ibid. at 47-48, 1211; Craig, supra note 11 at 357, 15.
147. Ibid. at 51, 1212; Craig, ibid. at 356-357, 14-15.
148. E.g. Wannamaker v. Livingston, supra note 48 at paras. 21 & 38, Kelly J; Salvation Army Canada
West v. Allen Estate, supra note 58 at paras. 46 & 53, Oppal J.
149. Gaudet v. Knudsen (1985), 36 A.C.W.S. (2d) 60 (B.C.S.C), rev'd Gaudet v. Frigstad(1987), 7
A.C.W.S. (3d) 226 (B.C.C.A.).
150. Wannamaker v. Livingston, supra note 48 at para. 68, Ferguson J.A.
151. Gaudet v. Frigstad, supra note 149 at para. 7, Anderson J.A.
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influence cases. For example, in Patamis Estate v. Bajoraitis5 2 Philp
J. did not apply a presumption of undue influence, but considered the
description of undue influence in Geffen for guidance.'5 3 In Bakken v.
Bakken,5" however, Armstrong J. relied on Geffen and held that undue
influence could either be proved or presumed to have taken place in the
light of the relationship of the parties.'55 He observed that it was implicit
in the approach of Wilson J. that there must be some suspicion and some
facts upon which a presumption could arise. 5 6 However, in Bakken undue
influence was neither proven nor was there sufficient evidence upon which
a presumption could arise.'57
After Vout, a number of judges treated Geffen as a major authority
regarding the onus of proof for testamentary undue influence.'58 In other
cases the courts considered the description of undue influence in Geffen
for guidance, but did not always suggest that a rebuttable presumption will
arise if a relationship of domination exists between the beneficiary and the
testator. 9 In Re Morash Estate,16 for example, Hall J. decided, consistently
with Vout, that it was open to a party to prove undue influence, but also
observed that a rebuttable presumption of undue influence could also arise.
In this case, a testatrix made a will under which a daughter from her first
marriage was named as a co-executrix, trustee and principal beneficiary.
The testatrix remarried and made a second will under which the daughter
was removed as a co-executrix and was no longer a beneficiary (except that
certain outstanding debts were forgiven). The daughter contended that the
second husband exercised undue influence over her mother. Hall J. held,
inter alia, that a rebuttable presumption arose because the testatrix had
been highly dependent on her husband who had dominated conversations
with lawyers engaged to prepare the second will. This presumption was
not rebutted. 161 He did not explain how a rebuttable presumption of undue
influence could exist in the light of considerable Canadian authority to the
contrary. Instead, he appears to have assumed that such a presumption did
not conflict with the decision in Vout, but rather complemented it. Indeed, in
152. (1994), 2 E.T.R. (2d) 200 (Ont. Gen. Div).
153. Ibid. at para. 96, Philp J.
154. (1992), 104 Sask.R. 67, [1992] 6 W.W.R. 615.
155. Ibid. at para 29, Armstrong J.
156. Ibid. at para. 31, Armstrong J.
157. Ibid. at para. 32, Armstrong J.
158. E.g. Doherty, supra note 41; Kosowan v. Berezowski (1997), 19 E.T.R. (2d) 299 (Sask. Q.B);
Banton v. Banton, supra note 47.
159. E.g. Begin v. Begin (2000), 267 A.R. 29 (Alta. Q.B.) at paras. 87-100, Mason J.
160. (2002), 209 N.S.R. (2d) 288, 49 E.T.R (2d) 93 (N.S.Pro.C.). See also Kaczmarczyk v.
Kaczmarczyk, supra note 126; Pyle v. Pyle Estate, 2003 MBQB 129; Butler v. Bird (2002), 206 N.S.R.
(2d) 364 (N.S.S.C.) [Butler].
161. Ibid. at paras. 47 & 49; cf. Butler, ibid.
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some cases courts have imposed a rebuttable presumption, but maintained
that the person challenging the will still completely bears the burden of
proof, 62 although this appears to contradict both the orthodox notion of a
rebuttable presumption and Vout. Finally, in other cases it has been simply
assumed without explanation that the same rebuttable presumption applies
to both inter vivos and testamentary gifts. 163
Whether the application of a rebuttable presumption in a testamentary
context based on the criteria in Geffen would be workable remains
debatable. The concept of undue influence described by Wilson J. is
very broad so that the imposition of such a presumption could have the
unintended effect of undermining the true and legitimate intention of the
testator. A testator may decide to make gifts to persons who are capable
of and have the opportunity of exercising undue influence in the form of
coercion or domination. These persons, although innocent, may be unable
to provide adequate evidence to rebut the presumption.
A gift made when the beneficiary is involved in the making of the
will
In a seminal article on undue influence and the suspicious circumstances
rule,' 6 Kerridge argued that two important presumptions ought to
regulate the making of wills. First, potential beneficiaries ought to be
placed on notice that if they or a person on their behalf are involved in
the will-making process, then the beneficiary will be required to rebut an
automatic presumption of undue influence and fraud. In order to rebut the
presumption, the beneficiary will have to produce evidence that proves
the testator acted independently and was neither coerced nor misled. 65
Therefore, participation in the will-making process becomes equivalent to
active coercion. A rebuttable presumption of undue influence effectively
transforms circumstances that originally triggered the suspicious
162. Stiles Estate v. Stiles (2003), 1 E.T.R. (3d) 120, 17 Alta. L.R. (4") 295, 341 A.R. 249. [2003]
9 W.W.R. 496 at paras. 96-98, Hutchinson J. In Brown v. Zaitsoff Estate (2001), 209 Sask.R. 234
(Sask. Q.B.) affd (2002) 217 Sask.R. 130 (Sask. C.A.) it appeared to be reduced to an evidential
presumption only.
163. Cullen Estate v. Filla (26 February 2002), 37027T/01, 2002 WL 38642 (Ont. S.C.J); Brown v.
ZaitsoffEstate, supra note 162; West v. Jopp-Shelton (2004), 8 E.T.R. (3d) 200,248 Sask.R. 293 (Sask.
Q.B); Kaczmarczyk v. Kaczmarczyk, supra note 126. In Dansereau Estate v. Vallee (15 July 1999),
Edmonton 9503-02643 (Alta. Q.B.) it was conceded by the beneficiary that a presumption of undue
influence arose in respect to the will in so far as the undue influence was alleged within the context and
doctrine in the decision in Vout. In Fair v. Campbell Estate (2002), 3 E.T.R. 48 (Ont. S.C.J.) it was
assumed that the same test applied in respect to testamentary and inter vivos gifts, at para. 29, Langdon
J. However, it was unclear whether the plaintiff's onus of proof required raising the presumption or
proving coercion.
164. Kerridge, "Suspicious Circumstances," supra note 1.
165. Ibid. at 331.
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circumstances rule in Barry166 into the basis for a rebuttable presumption
of undue influence. 167
Second, Kerridge suggested that wills ought to be executed in the
presence of notaries or solicitors who are totally independent of and in
no way connected with the beneficiaries. In this way, an independent
party will be able to be satisfied that undue influence and fraud have not
been perpetrated. Where there are concerns about the testator's capacity
it will be incumbent on the independent practitioner to seek medical
assistance. 168 While Kerridge did not suggest that the execution of wills in
the presence of independent notaries and legal practitioners be obligatory,
he recommended that where the procedure was adopted, there should be a
presumption that the testator had capacity and that there had been no undue
influence or fraud.'69 In the absence of the procedure, the propounder must
prove capacity and disprove undue influence and fraud.
The advantage of Kerridge's dual presumptions is that they are
formulated to take into account problems that occur specifically in the
testamentary context. The downside of the first presumption is that it is
unclear what would constitute involvement in the will-making process. If
indirect assistance triggers the presumption, then innocent beneficiaries
could be caught by the presumption without the essential evidence for a
rebuttal. Conversely, there may be conduct other than actual participation
in the will-making process that inhibits the testator's independent action.
Therefore, the second presumption has merit because it would encourage
testators and their lawyers to seek independent confirmation and execution
of the will. However, even the second presumption may not completely
protect testators who may be reluctant to disclose to independent
practitioners attempts to influence them.
c. Rebutting the presumption
A rebuttable presumption of undue influence needs to specify how the
presumption will be rebutted. In testamentary cases, there would be two
subsidiary issues: who would be required to rebut the presumption and
what kind of evidence would rebut it.
It remains unclear whether the propounder of the will or the beneficiary
of the gift (assuming that they are different persons) would bear the burden
of rebuttal. Kerridge 170 and Ridge 7' have argued that the beneficiary
166. Supra note 66.
167. The impetus for such a presumption stemmed from such cases as Wintle v. Nye, supra note 38;
Kerridge, "Suspicious Circumstances," supra note I at 322.
168. Kerridge, "Suspicious Circumstances," supra note I at 333.
169. Ibid. at 332.
170. Ibid. at 331.
171. Ridge, supra note I at 619.
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ought to bear the burden of proving affirmatively that the testator acted
freely and independently. If the beneficiary bears the burden of rebutting
the presumption regarding a gift under the will that did not comprise the
whole of the testator's estate, the rest of the will could still be valid.'72
This also accords with the view that the initial and only essential duty of
the propounder of the will is to demonstrate testamentary capacity and
knowledge and approval. However, in Re Morash Estate73 a beneficiary
against whom allegations of undue influence arose and whose conduct
triggered the presumption was dead. The propounders of the will were
required to deal with the allegations of undue influence rather than the
beneficiary's representatives or other beneficiaries who gained from the
exercise of influence.
Another issue is: in what circumstances would the presumption be
rebutted? In inter vivos cases it is not sufficient to demonstrate that the
donor understood what he was doing or its practical significance. Instead,
in England'74 and Canada'75 the donee must demonstrate that the donor
exercised a free intention and acted independently. For example, the donor
may have sought and taken independent legal advice. In a testamentary
context, a testator's independent and free action could be established
by demonstrating that an independent solicitor advised the testator and
the beneficiary did not participate in the will-making process. Whether
independent advice would be necessary to rebut the presumption in
a testamentary context is unclear.'76 Perhaps strong evidence of the
independent character of the testator would suffice. 177
2. Modification of significant elements in the testamentary doctrine
So far only two approaches to the doctrine of undue influence have been
discussed. They are to prove coercion or to rely on a rebuttable presumption
of undue influence. Canadian courts, however, have demonstrated that
there is a third possible approach to proving testamentary undue influence.
It is by modifying those elements of testamentary undue influence that
have limited the utility of the doctrine, namely, the definition of undue
172. Traditionally, if only part of a will was found invalid due to undue influence, that part was
rejected and the remainder of the will could be admitted to probate: Clark & Ross Martyn, supra note
26 at 42.
173. Supra note 160.
174. E.g. Allcard v. Skinner (1887), 36 Ch.D 145 at 171, Cotton J.; Singh v. Singh (1913), L.R. 41 Ind.
Ape. 23 at 31 (P.C.); Barclays Bankplc v. O'Brien, supra note 101 at 198, Lord Browne-Wilkinson.
175. Geffen, supra note 87 at 228, Wilson J.
176. See Inche Noriah v. ShaikAllie Bin Omar (1928), [1929] A.C. 127 (P.C.), which established that
independent advice was not necessary in inter vivos transactions.
177. Consider McCullough Estate v. McCullough (1998), (sub noma. McCullough Estate, Re) 212
A.R. 74, 168 W.A.C. 74, 22 E.T.R. (2d) 29, [1998] A.J. No. 11l (Alta. C.A.) at para. 104; Pyle v. Pyle
Estate, supra note 160 at para. 14, Darichuk J.
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influence, the evidence that can be relied on to prove undue influence
and the standard of proof. While the party who challenges the validity of
the will still bears the legal burden of proving undue influence, the three
modified doctrinal and evidential standards are more achievable than those
prescribed under the traditional doctrine and are in accord with modem
trends. A fully modified testamentary doctrine requires adjustment of all
three elements.
a. The testator ' independence and freedom
In the nineteenth century testamentary undue influence was almost entirely
defined as coercion and most courts overlooked the significant subtleties
in Boyse. First, Lord Cranworth proffered another definition of undue
influence in Boyse. The question was whether the influence had caused the
testator to sign a will that "did not really express his mind, but expressed
something else, something which he did not really mean."' 78 While coercive
conduct can force a testator to sign a document that does not express his
intention, it appears from this definition that it was not necessary to prove
actual coercion, but only undue influence. Therefore, coercion forms only
part of a wider framework of undue influence that focuses on free agency
and independent action. Indeed, this framework is also consistent with
the statements in Barry in the sense that Parke B. held that the validity of
a will depended upon a free and capable testator.I79 Second, in Boyse, 8 0
Hall v. Hall' and Wingrove v. Wingrove..2 the Courts recognized that,
in any event, coercion or pressure is a relative phenomenon. Depending
on the physical well-being, psychological strength and fears or hopes
of the testator, a potential beneficiary can exert minimal pressure which
still constitutes undue influence. Ultimately, the issue is not coercion, but
whether the testator has freely and independently expressed his intention
in the will.
The focus on whether the testator has acted freely and independently
is supported by modem authority. The inter vivos presumption of undue
influence in both England and Canada may be rebutted by evidence that
the donor's inter vivos gift was the "result of his own 'full, free and
informed thought."' "3 The suggestions for reform of testamentary undue
influence based on a rebuttable presumption of undue influence in probate
178. Supra note 9 at 34, 1205. See Earl of Sefton v. Hopwood, supra note 12 at 861.
179. Supra note 66 at 482-483, 1090.
180. Supra note 9 at 51, 1212.
181. Supra note 20 at 482, Sir J.P. Wilde.
182. Supra note 16 at 83, Sir James Hannen.
183. Geffen, supra note 87 at 228, Wilson J. quoting Lord Evershed in Zamet v. Hyman [1961] 3 All
E.R. 933 (C.A.) at 938.
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cases also require evidence of testamentary independence and freedom in
order to rebut the presumption.
In Canada the early approaches to testamentary undue influence were
resurrected by the Privy Council decision in Craig. In that case, the Privy
Council used language from both Lord Cranworth's statements in Boyse. It
did not discriminate between statements emphasizing the coercive conduct
and those that suggested that the essential issue was whether the testator
had signed a will that recorded what he really intended and meant. 184 It was
assumed that both definitions were consistent with one another and that
both supported coercion as the hallmark of testamentary undue influence.
Therefore, for most Canadian courts in the twentieth century testamentary
undue influence was limited to coercive conduct. However, in the latter
decades of the twentieth century some courts began to state either or both
tests' 85 or to simply omit reference to coercion in favour of whether the
testator had signed a will that expressed what he wished to happen to his
estate. 186 The transition seemed inconsequential at first and did not appear
to conflict with or modify the traditional doctrine because Boyse and
Craig were important traditional authorities. In Re Martin; MacGregor
v. Ryan 18 7 and Vout 88 the Supreme Court of Canada specifically referred
to the broader definition in Craig with approval (although there was
also reference to coercion in Re Martin189 and Vout' 90). It was no longer
necessary to demonstrate coercion or wrongdoing, although proof of
coercion remained one way of satisfying the test.
A helpful example of the shift from actual coercion to a broader concept
of undue influence can be found Re Kohut Estate.191 An elderly testatrix
made seven wills over an eight-year period in which she alternatively lived
with each of her daughters. The daughter with whom the testatrix resided at
184. Craig, supra note 11 at 357, 15.
185. E.g. Pocock v. Pocock, supra note 48 at para. 44, Aylesworth J.A.; Carleton v. Goldstone, supra
note 51 at paras. 41 & 42, McIntyre J.; Roberge v. Roberge, [1995] B.C.W.L.D. 952, [1995] B.C.J. No.
145 (B.C.S.C.) at para. 14, Boyd J.; Scramstad v. Stannard(1 996), 40 Alta L.R. (3d) 324 (Alta.Q.B.) at
para. 147, Binder J; Doherty, supra note 41 at para. 27, Ayles J.A.; Re Muise Estate (2002), 45 E.T.R.
(2d) 121 (N.S. Pro. Ct.) at para. 17, Stewart J.; Bates v. Finley Estate, supra note 41 at paras. 115-116,
Drost J.; Gamble v. McCormick (2001), 3 E.T.R. (3d) 232 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 93, Greer J.
186. E.g. Re Mann Estate, supra note 56 at para. 49, Stratton J.; Kostynuik v. Brychun, supra note
57 at para. 37, Maher Surr. Ct. J.; Re 73mm; RedDeer College v. Nishioka (1985), 65 A.R. 190 (Alta.
Surr. Ct.) at para. 34, Smith J.; Drummond v. Mitchell (2003), 215 N.S.R. (2d) 47; 2 E.T.R. (3d) 36
(N.S.S.C) at para. 57, MacLellan J. In Patamis Estate v. Bajoraitis, supra note 152 at paras. 78 & 96-
97, Philp J. drew on both the definition provided by the Privy Council in Craig, supra note 11 at 357,
15 and the inter vivos definition in Geffen, supra, note 87 at 226-228, Wilson J.
187. Supra note 41 at 138, Ritchie J.
188. Supra note 44 at 441-442, Sopinka J.
189. Supra note 41 at 139, Ritchie J. His Honour quoted Riach, supra note 41 at 128, Crocket J.
190. Supra note 44 at 442. See also Feraco v. Shimoon, [2001] O.J. No. 1197 (Ont. Sup. Ct. Jus.) at
para. 36, Chadwick J. (QL).
191. Supra note 126.
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the time she made a new will was the principal beneficiary under that will.
The Court was satisfied that the mother possessed testamentary capacity
and that neither daughter had actually coerced her mother into making a
will in which she was the principal beneficiary. Kennedy J. held that:
The proof of undue influence does not require evidence to demonstrate
that a testator was forced or coerced by another to make a will under
some threat or other inducement. One must look at all the surrounding
circumstances and determine whether or not a testator had a sufficiently
independent operating mind to withstand competing influences. Mere
influence by itself is insufficient to cause the court to intervene but as
has been said, the will must be "the offspring of his own volition and not
the record of someone else's."' 92
The Court concluded that the last four wills were the product of undue
influence because the mother was highly susceptible to the wishes of
her daughters. Kennedy J. held that the wills were "the result of what
those around her had in mind and not the exercise of the deceased's own
volition, albeit influence innocently exerted."' 93
b. Circumstantial evidence
In Boyse 19 4 Lord Cranworth held that testamentary undue influence must
be proved by direct evidence of a very high standard.' 95 Nevertheless,
it is inaccurate to suggest that Lord Cranworth considered that indirect
or circumstantial evidence had no part to play in the proof of coercion.
Circumstantial evidence is an evidentiary fact (or facts) from which
the judge or jury are able to infer reasonably the existence of the fact in
issue. 196 Lord Cranworth had circumstantial evidence in mind when he
suggested that strong evidence of a beneficiary's complete control over
the testator could constitute evidence of coercion, although there was no
evidence of the actual circumstances in which the will was made.' 97
Despite the narrow range of evidence that has traditionally been
considered in testamentary undue influence cases, some courts have
increasingly accepted that a party challenging the validity of a will may
be able to rely exclusively on circumstantial evidence. It is likely that
a beneficiary will exert undue influence in secret, rather than openly.
Therefore, undue influence will usually be proved by circumstantial
192. Ibid. at para. 38 quoting Hall, supra note 20 at 482, Sir J.P. Wilde.
193. Ibid. atpara. 42.
194. Supra note 9.
195. Ibid. at 50-51, 1212.
196. Sir R. Cross & C. Tapper, Cross on Evidence, 7" ed. (London: Butterworths,1990) at 202; R. v.
Cinous [2002] S.C.C. 29, (2002), 210 D.L.R. (41h) 64 at paras. 88-89, McLachlin C.J.C. and Bastarche
J.
197. Boyse, supra note 9 at 51, 1212.
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rather than direct evidence 98; and it will be necessary, from a practical
perspective, to make an inference of undue influence by reviewing all the
facts. 199 Indeed, some courts have accepted that it is permissible to rely
on indirect or circumstantial evidence while in other respects apparently
following the traditional doctrine of testamentary undue influence. 00
A reliance on circumstantial evidence is also reflected in the doctrine
of suspicious circumstances and proposals for reform based on a
presumption of undue influence. In the former, the production of evidence
which indirectly suggests undue influence or from which undue influence
may be inferred, requires the propounder to demonstrate that the testator
knew and approved the will.20' In the latter, a rebuttable presumption is
built on circumstantial evidence that may suggest undue influence and, in
turn, requires proof that the testator acted freely and independently.
An emphasis on whether the testator acted freely and independently,
rather than on proof of coercion, has also opened the way for reliance
on circumstantial evidence. In Scott v. Cousins 0 2 an elderly testatrix had
made earlier wills in favour of her relatives. After her second marriage
she made another will leaving her assets to her second husband and his
relatives. The beneficiaries under the earlier wills argued successfully
that the latest will was invalid because of, inter alia, the husband's undue
influence. Cullity J. observed that it was unnecessary to demonstrate that
the elderly testator was threatened or terrorized203 and that:
In determining whether undue influence has been established by
circumstantial evidence, courts have traditionally looked to such matters
as the willingness or disposition of the person alleged to have exercised
it, whether an opportunity to do so existed and the vulnerability of the
testator or testatrix... Other matters that have been regarded as relevant,
198. In respect to England see Carapeto, supra note 32 at para. 126, Rimer J. aff'd [2002] E.W.C.A.Civ.
944 (C.A. Civ. Div.). In respect to Canada see Banton, supra note 47 at 209, Cullity J.; Scott v. Cousins,
supra note 44 at para. 48, Cullity J.; Araujo v. Neto, supra note 138 at para. 132, Sigurdson J. In some
jurisdictions it is possible to prove traditional testamentary undue influence solely on circumstantial
evidence, although this has been difficult: see the Australian authority Winter v. Crighton (1991), 23
N.S.W.L.R. 116 (P.D.).
199. Consider Re Kaufman, supra note 43 at 190 Schroeder J.; Hicks v. Hicks (1997), 16 E.T.R. (2d)
179 (B.C.S.C.) at paras. 50-51, Shaw J. aff'd (1998), 22 E.T.R.(2d) 253 (B.C.C.A.); Re Kohut Estate,
supra note 126 at para. 38, Kennedy J.; Scott v. Cousins, supra note 44 at para. 48, Cullity J.; DeWitt v.
Williams (2004), 12 E.T.R. (3d) 150, 276 N.B.R. (2d) 53 (N.B.P.C) at para. 36, Russell J aff'd [2005]
N.B.J. No 295 (N.B.C.A).
200. Consider Re Kaufman, supra note 43. Jones v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (2003),
(sub nom. Wyker Estate Re) 1 E.T.R. (3d) 312, 338 A.R. 343 (Alta. Surr. Ct.); Ravnyshyn v. Drys
(2005), 15 E.T.R. (3d) 251, [2005] B.C.W.L.D. 3531, [2005] B.C.W.L.D. 3532.
201. E.g. Riach, supra note 41.
202. Supra note 44.
203. Ibid. at para. 114, Cullity J. See also Sullivan v. Bellows (2002), 4 E.T.R. (3d) 125 (Ont.S.C.J) at
para. 28.
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within limits, are the absence of moral claims of the beneficiaries under
the will or of other reasons why the deceased should have chosen to
benefit them. The fact that the will departs radically from the dispositive
pattern of previous wills has also been regarded as having some probative
force.
2 04
Cullity J. held that the husband had planned the acquisition of his wife's
property and the wife was susceptible to undue influence because of
her weakened mental state. He also relied on the last minute reversal of
the pattern of the wife's earlier wills and the absence of any plausible
reason why she would substitute her husband's relatives for her own. 05
The decision was arguably an important juncture in the modification
of testamentary undue influence. First, contrary to earlier authority,
Cullity J. accepted that the existence of the opportunity to influence
was part of a wider matrix of factors that a court could consider.20 6 It is
probable that the mere opportunity to influence on its own would not be
sufficient to constitute undue influence but would be weighed with other
circumstances.0 7 Second, Cullity J. also considered the susceptibility
of the wife to undue influence as well as the conduct of the husband.
Therefore, consistent with earlier nineteenth century English authorities,
courts will be able to evaluate a wide variety of circumstances 2 8 that will
shed light on the relative strengths and weaknesses of the two parties,
including the testator's mental and physical health20 9 and his practical,
emotional or financial dependence on the beneficiary.
2 10
c. Balance ofprobabilities
In Boyse Lord Cranworth held that where a will was otherwise valid, the
party challenging the validity of the will had to demonstrate that undue
influence was the only possible explanation for the existence of the will.2 1
1
Regrettably, Lord Cranworth did not fully explain why the standard of
proof was so high, although it appears that the Court was disinclined to
204. Ibid. at para. 114, Cullity J. This statement was recently quoted with approval by the New
Brunswick Court of Appeal in DeWitt v. Williams [2005] N.B.J. No. 295 at para. 8.
205. Ibid. at para. 123, Cullity J.
206. However, contrast a later case, Pascu v. Benke (2005), 13 E.T.R. (3d) 295 (Ont. S.C.J) at para.
26, Day J.
207. Note also Streisfield v. Goodman, supra note 138 at paras. 141-143, Carnwath J.
208. Consider Araujo v. Neto, supra note 138 at para. 133, Sigurdson J.; Stephens v. Austin (2003),
50 E.T.R. (2d) 255 (B.C.S.C.) at para. 165, Neilson J; Ravnyshyn v. Drys, supra note 200 at para. 99,
Warren J. In Ravnyshyn, Warren J. placed these kinds of criteria within a "standard of "coercion."
209. See generally Silberfeld, supra note 79.
210. See Feraco v. Shimoon, supra note 186 at paras. 37-38, Chadwick J; DeWitt v. Williams, supra
note 199 at para.3 6, Russell J aff'd [2005] N.B.J. No 295 (N.B.C.A). Cf. Surrendi Estate v. Surrendi
(2001), 42 E.T.R. (2d) 311 (Alta. Q.B.) at para 44, Slatter J.
211. Supra note 9 at 51, 1212. See Craig, supra note II at 357, 15.
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find that a will was invalid simply because undue influence was one of
several explanations.
Recently, some Canadian and English courts have neglected or rejected
the higher standard of proof in favour of the civil standard of proof, the
balance of probabilities, when considering testamentary undue influence.' 12
Some courts have assumed that the standard to be applied is the balance
of probabilities213 without noting the standard prescribed in Boyse. Others
have explained that the application of a higher standard would mean
that undue influence would cease to have a practical significance.2 14 The
adoption of the civil standard of proof has modernized testamentary undue
influence particularly when courts have combined it with an investigation
of whether the testator acted freely and independently by reference to
actual and circumstantial evidence. 2 5 Although this standard of proof is
not as onerous as the one applied to traditional testamentary influence, it
is unlikely that a court will find undue influence and refuse probate of an
otherwise valid will on the existence of a mere possibility of influence.21 6
3. The preferable approach
This paper has outlined the traditional doctrine and the two major possible
reforms. The question then is: which approach is the most desirable,
particularly in the light of the testamentary context?
The modified doctrine of testamentary undue influence is preferable
to the traditional doctrine because, in comparison, the modified doctrine
imposes practical and achievable thresholds. Moreover, the shift from
proof of coercion to an investigation of whether the will recorded the
testator's free and independent wishes means that the court is able to
review a broad range of evidence including: the relationship of the testator
and the beneficiary; the testator's health and susceptibility to undue
influence; the facts actually leading up to and surrounding the execution of
the will; and any past dispositions. The court will also have the benefit of
212. It is strongly arguable that the earlier standard set a higher threshold than the criminal standard
of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt. Consider: Woolmington v. D.PP. [1935] A.C. 462 at 481, Lord
Sankey (H.L.); Miller v. Minister of Pensions [1947] 2 All E.R. 372 at 373-374, Lord Denning; R. v.
Lifchus (1997), 9 S.C.R. (5d1) 1 at 13-14 (S.C.C.).
213. In respect to England see Carapeto, supra note 32 at para. 124, Rimer J, aff'd on merits [2002]
E.W.C.A.Civ. 944 (C.A.Civ.Div.). In respect to Canada see, e.g., Banton, supra note 47 at 209, Cullity
J.; Re Kohut Estate, supra note 126 at para. 42, Kennedy J.; Araujo v. Neto, supra note 138 at para.
132, Sigurdson J.; Stephens v. Austin, supra note 208 at para. 164, Neilson J.; Drummond v. Mitchell
(2003), 215 N.S.R. (2d) 47; 2 E.T.R. (3d) 36 (N.S.S.C) at para. 55, MacLellan J.; Pascu v. Benke,
supra note 206 at para. 26, Day J.; MacKenzie, supra, note 39 at para 3.5.
214. Scott v. Cousins, supra note 44 at para. 48, Cullity J.
215. Consider Scott v. Cousins, ibid; Araujo v. Neto, supra note 138.
216. The standard does vary according to the matters in issue: e.g. Bater v. Bater [1951] P. 35 (C.A.)
at 36-37, Lord Denning; Blyth v. Blyth [1966] A.C. 643 (H.L.) at 673, Lord Pearce.
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evidence from a wide array of persons who had dealings with the testator
including relatives, friends, carers, medical and legal practitioners. The
modified doctrine fills the "unintended gap" when there are no doubts that
the testator possessed testamentary capacity and had known and approved
the terms of the will.
The modified doctrine of testamentary undue influence is also
preferable to a rebuttable presumption of undue influence. First, the
problem is that a presumption of undue influence could be triggered by
factors that do not fully shed light on whether the testator acted freely and
independently. In contrast, the modified doctrine focuses on the evaluation
of all the available evidence, rather than arranging the evidence to suit the
particular criteria of a rebuttable presumption. A review of all the relevant
evidence could include, for example, the existence of a relationship of
trust and confidence or the opportunity to dominate the will of the testator.
However, these would not be the only or necessarily the most significant
factors. Second, a rebuttable presumption allows the party who challenges
the will to trigger the presumption by presenting wholly circumstantial
evidence. Yet this evidence may not conclusively demonstrate that the
will was not the product of the testator's free and independent intention.
In contrast, the modified doctrine has preserved the traditional burden of
proof on the party challenging the will. This is particularly significant if the
evidence produced is wholly circumstantial. Third, the modified doctrine
maintains the utility of the doctrine of suspicious circumstances where the
key issue is whether the testator knew and approved of the will. While the
same evidence may be used to plead suspicious circumstances and undue
influence, the evidence will be measured against the separate standards
of knowledge and approval on the one hand, and free and independent
intention on the other.
IV. The reform of testamentary undue influence
Any doctrine of testamentary undue influence ought to be regulated
by reference to three matters that, in combination, would significantly
diminish the likelihood of grants of probate where undue influence had
been perpetrated.
1. Additional presumption of validity
As discussed previously, Kerridge suggested that there ought to be a
presumption in favour of validity of a will and against undue influence
when the finalization and execution of the will is in the presence of notaries
or solicitors who are totally independent of and in no way connected
with the beneficiaries. Kerridge stopped short of recommending that the
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execution of wills must be in the presence of independent practitioners. 17
Nevertheless, failure to comply with the recommended procedure would
mean that the propounder bears the significant burden of disproving undue
influence and fraud. However, Kerridge assumed that there will be no
change to the traditional doctrine of testamentary undue influence.
In the light of the modified doctrine it is preferable to adopt only a
part of Kerridge's scheme. When the finalization and execution of the
will is in the presence of notaries or solicitors who have not drafted the
will and who are not connected with the beneficiaries, there should be a
rebuttable presumption that there is no undue influence and the testator
executed a will that recorded his free and independent intention. It would
remain a rebuttable presumption because there could be circumstances
where the testator feared revealing his true wishes even to the independent
practitioners. The party challenging the will still bears the burden of
proving undue influence on the balance of probabilities even if the will
was executed in the presence of an independent practitioner.
2. The modified doctrine of testamentary undue influence applied in all
testamentary cases
Whether the will has been executed in accordance with the additional
safeguards outlined above, the modified doctrine of undue influence ought
to be implemented. A party challenging a will ought to demonstrate that a
review of all the relevant evidence reveals on the balance of probabilities
that it does not record the testator's free and independent intention.
In addition, courts could adopt a less strict approach to costs. The
traditional approach has been that when a party fails to prove undue
influence, the party bears the costs of the action.218 It appears that courts
wish to discourage costly and vexatious litigation. However, it is submitted
that courts ought to take a flexible approach to costs219 when applying the
modified doctrine. For example, where there is significant initial evidence
that suggests that the will did not represent the intention of the testator,
but the challenge is unsuccessful on the balance of probabilities, it may
be appropriate for either the estate to bear the costs or the parties to bear
217. Kerridge, "Suspicious Circumstances," supra note 1 at 334.
218. Spiers v. English [ 1907] P. 122; Re Cutcliffe (deceased); Le Duc v. Veness, supra note 17; Maben
v. Urquhart, supra note 52; Re Nickle, [1973] 3 W.W.R. 97 (Alta. Surr. Ct.); Bates v. Finley Estate,
supra note 41.
219. Consider Wilson v. Bassil [ 1903] P. 239 at 242, Walton J.; Kerridge, "Suspicious Circumstances,"
supra note I at 331-332.
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their own costs. In any event there is evidence that courts in Canada are
exercising discretion over costs when the case warrants it. 220
3. The application of the modified doctrine of testamentary undue
influence when the donor in an inter vivos transaction is deceased
Ridge points out that it is artificial to apply a different test for undue
influence based on whether the gifts made by a person took effect before
or after his death. 221 The anomaly is stark when the making of the inter
vivos gift takes place shortly before or simultaneously with the making
of the will.222 Her solution is that a rebuttable presumption ought to apply
whether the gift becomes effective when the donor is alive or when the
donor is dead.23
There are, however, two problems with this approach. First, the
factual circumstances may not trigger the relevant rebuttable presumption.
Therefore, the wishes of the donor may not be protected from the effects of
undue influence; and the transaction will not be scrutinized appropriately.
Second, the donor is not available to provide his or her version of the
events surrounding the making of the testamentary gift. It is arguable
therefore that a presumption of undue influence inter vivos ought to
apply only when the donor either brings the action against the donee or is
available to give evidence at the time of the trial. It would be preferable
to apply the modified doctrine of testamentary undue influence when
there are concerns that the deceased donor has not exercised a free and
independent intention in respect to the making of an inter vivos gift or the
will or both. This approach addresses both the anomaly referred to above
and the fact that the donor/testator is unavailable to give evidence.224 The
kinds of situations that would benefit from the application of a single
modified doctrine of testamentary undue influence include those where
shortly before the donor's death, the donor had made an inter vivos gift
which incidentally but significantly depleted the assets for distribution
under the testator's will 25; the donor had made an inter vivos gift which,
220. E.g. McAllister v. McMillan (1911), 25 O.L.R. 1 (Ont. C.A); Trites v. Johnson, [1945] 3 W.W.R.
100 (B.C.S.C.); Re Martin; MacGregor v. Ryan, supra note 41; Jones v. Canadian Imperial Bank,
supra note 200; Smither v. Smither (2002), 45 E.T.R.(2d) 304 (Ont. S.C.J).
221. Ridge, supra note I at 635. See also Klinck, supra note 86 at 136-140.
222. E.g. Robichaud (Litigation Guardian oj) v. Plourde (2000), 35 E.T.R. (2d) 269, 230 N.B.R. (2d)
141 (N.B.Q.B.).
223. Ridge, supra note I at 638. Consider Thompson Estate v. Lougheed (2004), 6 E.T.R. (3d) 135
(B.C.S.C.); Morgan (Guardian adlitem o]) v. Lizotte (2003), 49 E.T.R. (2d) 224 (B.C.S.C); and Soule
Estate v. Vowles, 2000 BCSC 848.
224. See Klinck, supra note 86 at 136-137.
225. E.g. Kaczmarczyk v. Kaczmarczyk, supra note 126; Thompson Estate v. Lougheed, supra note
223; Morgan (Guardian ad litem 0) v. Lizotte, supra note 223; and Soule Estate v. Vowles, supra note
223.
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as part of a wider scheme of asset distribution, significantly depleted the
assets for distribution under the testator's will226; or the donor had made
both inter vivos and testamentary gifts to the same donee/ beneficiary
simultaneously or within a short interval.
Conclusion
It has been assumed that undue influence can be proved in only two
ways: either by direct proof of coercion or by relying on a presumption
of undue influence. For the English ecclesiastical and probate judges in
the nineteenth century only the former was appropriate in testamentary
cases. In the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries English courts have
continued to apply conscientiously the traditional doctrine of testamentary
undue influence. Nonetheless, commentators and law reformers have
argued that this doctrine is unworkable as it is almost impossible to
prove coercion. Consequently, they have sought the imposition of a
presumption of testamentary undue influence, despite problems associated
with the testamentary context. Initially in Canada there was also a strong
adherence to the traditional testamentary doctrine. However, in the late
twentieth century some courts abandoned the traditional doctrine in favour
of either an inter vivos presumption of testamentary undue influence or
modification of elements of the traditional doctrine in order to make it more
feasible to challenge a will. It has been argued in this article that neither
the traditional doctrine of testamentary undue influence nor a presumption
of testamentary undue influence adequately protects testators or their true
testamentary intentions. Instead, in both jurisdictions, a modified doctrine
of testamentary undue influence ought to be a cornerstone of a three-tiered
scheme focusing on the process of will-making and the testator's free and
independent intention.
226. E.g. Plamondon v. Czaban (2004), 8 E.T.R. (3d) 135, 31 Alta. L.R. (4h) 215, [2005] 3 W.W.R.
23 (C.A.); Robichaud (Litigation Guardian 0]) v. Plourde, supra note 222. Consider also Bridgewater
v Leahy, supra note 117.
